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Economic and Financial Approaches to Valuing Pension Liabilities
Abstract
Financial economics holds that payment streams should be valued using discount rates that reflect the cash
flows’ risks. In the case of pension liabilities, the appropriate discount rate for a pension fund’s liabilities is the
expected rate of return on a portfolio that would be held under a liability-driven investment policy. The
valuation of defined benefit (DB) pension obligations involves choices revolving around deciding 1) what
future benefit payments to recognize today (i.e., which liability concept to use); and 2) from whose point of
view to value the liabilities. Moving towards modeling the distribution of future liabilities using a “risk-
neutral” framework would allow for calculating the present value of the future liabilities more accurately. This
would provide policymakers with information more relevant for decisionmaking, and it would also permit





















Pension Research Council Working Paper 
Pension Research Council 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302 









The research reported herein was pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as 
part of the Retirement Research Consortium (RRC); the author also acknowledges support from The Pension 
Research Council at The Wharton School. All findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and 
do not represent the views of the SSA or any agency of the federal government, the MRRC, the PRC, or The 
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper 
represent the views of the authors and not those of the Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. ©2013 
Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved. 
 




Financial economics holds that payment streams should be valued using discount rates that 
reflect the cash flows’ risks.  In the case of pension liabilities, the appropriate discount rate for a 
pension fund’s liabilities is the expected rate of return on a portfolio that would be held under a 
liability-driven investment policy. The valuation of defined benefit (DB) pension obligations 
involves choices revolving around deciding 1) what future benefit payments to recognize today 
(i.e., which liability concept to use); and 2) from whose point of view to value the liabilities. 
Moving towards modeling the distribution of future liabilities using a “risk-neutral” framework 
would allow for calculating the present value of the future liabilities more accurately. This would 
provide policymakers with information more relevant for decisionmaking, and it would also 
permit easier communication of the risks facing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s 
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Economic and Financial Approaches to Valuing Pension Liabilities 
Robert Novy-Marx 
Price is expected discounted payoff. This fundamental relation underlies all of 
asset pricing. The discount factor is an index of “bad times.” Because investors 
are willing to pay more for assets that do well in bad times, the risk premium on 
any asset is determined by how it co-varies with the discount factor. All of asset 
pricing comes down to techniques for measuring a discount factor in a way that is 
useful for specific application. 
— Cochrane and Culp, in Modern Risk Management 
 
Payment streams should be valued using discount rates that reflect the cash flows’ risks. 
This bedrock principle of financial economics goes back at least to the development of the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the 1960s (Treynor 1961; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965). 
The standard modern application involves discounting cash flows at rates that depend on the cash 
flows’ covariance with multiple priced risks (Ross 1976; Fama and French 1993). In the case of 
pension liabilities this may be interpreted concretely, as saying that the appropriate discount rate 
for a pension fund’s liabilities is the expected rate of return on an optimal “hedge portfolio,” 
where this is the portfolio that would be held under a liability-driven investment policy (i.e., the 
portfolio of traded assets that has cash flows that most closely approximates the funds expected 
future benefit payments).  
While the basic methodology for valuing liabilities payments is well understood, its 




context-specific and which have a material impact on the calculation. The choices primarily 
revolve around deciding 1) what future benefit payments to recognize today (i.e., which liability 
concept to use); and 2) from whose point of view to value the liabilities. 
 
Liability Concept 
DB pensions are a form of delayed compensation. For work performed today, employees 
receive, in addition to their wages, promises of benefits to be paid after retirement. In order to 
value these benefits, one must first decide what expected future benefits should be recognized 
today. The broadest concept, the present value of benefits (PVB), recognizes all future expected 
benefit payments. This is analogous to accounting for the net present value of all of an 
employee’s expected future wages as a current liability, something that seems unreasonably 
broad for most applications. The public sector commonly recognizes pension liabilities using a 
concept called the pension benefit obligation (PBO), or a closely related methodology called the 
entry age normal (EAN). These account for future wage growth but not future service, and thus 
they recognize only a fraction of the PVB. The PBO recognizes the PVB in proportion to the 
fraction of an employee’s service earned to date, relative to the expected total at retirement. The 
EAN recognizes the PVB in proportion to the fraction of an employee’s discounted total wages 
earned to date relative to the expected total at retirement. The narrowest commonly used liability 
concept for DB pension plans is the accrued benefit obligation (ABO). This concept only 
recognizes the benefit payments that have been earned to date, and bases projected benefit 
payments off of an employee’s current wage history. It corresponds quite closely to the benefits 
that a worker would receive if the plan to which they belonged was shut down today, and is thus 




Broad measures of pension liabilities that account for wage growth (e.g., the PBO, EAN, 
or PVB) need to be discounted at higher rates. Wages are exposed to priced risks. Wage growth, 
the stock market, and the economy more broadly, must all be positively correlated, at least over 
longer horizons. According to Black (1989), “stocks go up when it looks like times will be good. 
In good times, wages and salaries and benefits all tend to grow faster than usual. Thus the 
broader your view of the pension liability, the more stocks you will need for hedging.” Lucas and 
Zeldes (2006) develop a framework for estimating appropriate risk-adjusted discount rates for 
DB pension liabilities, which account for future pension benefit payments’ exposure to the 
market through the wage growth channel. These issues are less relevant for the ABO, which is 
not exposed to wage risk, and the ABO is the most relevant liability concept for the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
Bulow (1982) argues that the is ABO is the appropriate liability concept for corporate 
plans quite generally, because broader concepts unreasonably imply an “implicit contract under 
which young workers accept lower total compensation in return for an informal agreement that 
they be highly paid later in their career.” This has implications beyond those directly related to 
exactly which benefits are currently recognized. Bulow (1982) suggests that an “example of the 
effect of such an assumption is that many mistakenly believe that if a worker’s benefits are tied 
to final salary, he is protected against inflation until retirement.” The existence (or lack thereof) 
of inflation protection impacts the appropriate discount rate to use for discounting liabilities, 
regardless of which exact liabilities are recognized. Bodie (1990) suggests that the “failure of 
pension funds to show any significant interest in inflation-protected investment products such as 
CPI-linked bonds is clear evidence that they [the plan sponsors] do not view their liabilities as 




Most importantly, under U.S. law, the PBGC’s guarantee only extends to benefits 
accrued prior to a firm’s bankruptcy filing. New (insured) accruals thus stop in plan terminations, 
or even before if bankruptcy predates a plan’s termination. The PBGC’s liability consequently 
only extends to the ABO liabilities, making it the most relevant liability concept when valuing 
DB pension liabilities for PBGC insurance purposes1.  
 
Valuation: Promises, or Expected Payments? 
The value of the same pension promises may not be the same from the point of view of 
different stake-holders. For example, retired participants of a plan administrated by a firm near 
bankruptcy may value their claims under the assumption that they are relatively safe, at least 
partly because of the existence of the PBGC insurance. These same expected benefit payments 
may be valued much lower by the firms’ stockholders, who have limited liability. Valuation of 
DB pension liabilities thus requires a decision, either explicit or implicit, about exactly which 
payments are being valued. This is basically a question of whether the payments being valued are 
the promised payments, or the payments that are actually expected to be made.  
For the last decade, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has required 
private sector firms to discount expected pension payments for reporting and funding purposes 
using corporate bond rates2. These prescribed discount rates implicitly value pension liabilities 
from the point of view of a firm’s equity holders. Corporate bond rates reflect the possibility that 
1 Broader concepts may be more appropriate in the public sector, where future benefit accruals 
often have statutory protections. 
2 For the previous 25 years, ERISA prescribed even lower discount rates, the 30-year Treasury 
yield. 
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firms may default on their debts. These rates thus account for fact that expected payments are 
smaller than promised payments (because of the possibility of default). They also include a risk 
premium that arises because defaults co-vary with priced risks (i.e., because defaults are more 
likely in bad times, when extra dollars are particularly valuable). ERISA thus prescribes that firm 
managers value the pension payments that the plan sponsor expects to actually make, not the 
payments the plan participants expect to receive3. 
The distinction arises from limited liability, and from the value of PBGC insurance itself. 
From the point of view of plan participants, PBGC insurance is a valuable asset. The insurance 
makes the future benefit payments (up to a limit) almost risk-free, and thus the stream of 
payments retirees expect to receive more valuable. From the point of view of the plan sponsor, 
PBGC insurance is less valuable, because in the event the insurance pays off, it is the 
participants, and not the sponsor, that receives the payments4. For the sponsor, limited liability 
essentially acts as a valuable put option, which reduces the value of the stream of benefits it 
promises. Under certain conditions, a sponsor’s liability is limited to the value of a plan’s assets, 
which is economically equivalent to owning an option to deliver the plan’s assets in exchange for 
the value of the plan’s liabilities. 
3 Technically these are valued as if other similar firms were responsible for the payments, 
because the ERISA-specified rate is not the firm-specific borrowing rate, but a high grade 
corporate index rate. 
4 PBGC insurance is not without value to the sponsor, because firms negotiate with employees 
over total compensation. PBGC insurance, which increases the value of pension benefits to 
workers, may thus reduce the direct wage compensation an employer must promise. 
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Conceptualizing the value of PBGC insurance as a put option allows for its valuation 
using the no-arbitrage techniques developed to price options (Black and Scholes 1973)5. The 
standard methodology for pricing derivative securities involves constructing the instrument’s 
replicating portfolio (the “synthetic” security), which generates the exact same cash flows at 
every date in the future in every possible future. Market forces ensure that the price of the 
derivative security must be close to the price of the hedge portfolio. 
A number of authors have used this framework to analyze the value of PBGC insurance 
(e.g., Marcus 1987 and Pennacchi and Lewis 1994), and particularly the moral hazard arising 
from the very existence of PBGC insurance. Bodie (1990) suggests that for underfunded plans 




ERISA (and later the Pension Protection Act of 2006) prescribe that firms account for 
their pension liabilities using rates that implicitly reflect the possibility of default, yet these rates 
may not be appropriate for valuing the PBGC’s liabilities. The PBGC exists to guarantee pension 
benefits. Because it will make payments that a plan sponsor cannot, it is inappropriate to use 
discount rates that reflect the possibility of the sponsor’s default when calculating the PBGC’s 
potential liabilities.  
The fact that the PBGC’s potential liability extends only to ABO benefits (subject to the 
payment cap), in conjunction with the fact that benefits paid by the PBGC are essentially risk-
5 These techniques can themselves be viewed as a particularly powerful application of the basic 
principle that cash flows should be discounted at rates that reflect their risks. 
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free, make the valuation of these liabilities relatively straightforward. The ABO is not affected 
by uncertainty about future wages and service, as the cash flows associated with the ABO are 
based completely on information known today (plan benefit formulas, current salaries, and 
current years of service). Mortality is relatively easy to forecast (probabilistically), and the 
uncertainty in these forecasts is largely idiosyncratic (i.e., uncorrelated with aggregate economic 
variables that may be related to discount rates)6. Pension promises related to termination 
liabilities, which are insensitive to wage risk, should thus be discounted at riskless rates of return 
(Sharpe 1976). 
This valuation is most concretely done by simply pricing the defeasance portfolio. A 
plan’s liabilities can be defeated (i.e., made null and void) by delivering a portfolio of securities 
that generate the income required to make all future benefit payments. The cost today of buying 
this replicating portfolio is the value of the liabilities. The defeasance portfolio can most easily 
be constructed using either true market annuities or default free bonds. 
The advantage of defeasing the liabilities using market annuities is that these already 
account for the impact of mortality on expected payouts, making the construction of the 
replicating portfolio particularly simple. Defeasing the liabilities this way yields insurance 
industry annuity pricing of the liabilities. Such pricing may slightly overstate the true cost of 
liabilities, because the market for these annuities is not as transparent or competitive as the 
market for high quality bonds. That is, insurance industry annuity pricing reflects the provider’s 
6 Plan experience suggests that the most commonly employed mortality tables have failed to 
adequately account for generational improvements in mortality. Mortality assumptions are an 
important driver of projected benefit payments, so this has tended to bias forecast liabilities 
downward. 
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profit margins, which are likely higher than those enjoyed by market makers in the bond 
market.7 This is likely more than fully offset by the fact the credit quality of the PBGC is 
superior to that of even the best annuity providers, which means that the value of an annuity 
provided by these companies is lower than that of a similar annuity provided by the PBGC. The 
PIMS model also uses annuity prices that come from surveys, not transactions. While the 
American Academy of Actuaries reports only modest differences (3-5%) between the PBGC’s 
survey prices and actual transaction prices, these differences are magnified in firms’ net pension 
liabilities.8 
The advantage of defeasing the liabilities using default-free bonds is that this may most 
accurately reflect the true cost of the liabilities provided by the PBGC. This does require 
forecasting the effects of mortality on expected payments, but this is relatively simple and 
straightforward. Because the liabilities are basically nominal (i.e., not inflation protected), the 
bonds employed in the defeasance calculation should themselves be nominal. Using Treasuries 
7 Insurance companies may also sometimes misprice annuities due to market imperfections. 
Koijen and Yogo (2013) argue that insurance companies were significantly underpricing 
annuities in late 2008 and early 2009, because of market losses that hurt their balance sheets, and 
statutory reserve regulations that allowed them to account for only a fraction of the true future 
insurance liability. 
8 For example, suppose a firm has $90 of pension assets, and pension liabilities valued at $95 
when calculated using annuity prices derived from surveys and $100 when calculated using 
annuity transaction prices. The firm’s net pension underfunding is only $5 when calculated using 
survey prices but $10 when calculated using transaction prices, a difference of 100%, despite the 
fact that the survey annuity prices are only 5% lower than the transaction prices. 
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would almost certainly yield a liability that overstates the liabilities’ true value, because 
Treasuries enjoy a significant liquidity premium (i.e., are expensive) due to their use as a safe-
haven asset, and because they have special status as a collateral asset (Longstaff 2004; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). The true value of the liabilities is thus probably 
more accurately reflected by the cost of the defeasance portfolio constructed using agency 
securities, which are close to risk-free but do not enjoy the special status of treasuries.  
While there are many subtle issues around the appropriate recognition and valuation of 
DB pension liabilities, valuing liabilities that the PBGC insures, is ultimately relatively 
straightforward. By law, the PBGC’s liabilities are limited to the ABO. The only risk the insured 
ABO cash flows are exposed to is mortality risk, which is basically unpriced. These liabilities are 
thus effectively risk-free, and they should therefore be discounted at risk-free rates. These rates 
are probably best reflected by the yields on agency securities, which are extremely unlikely to 
default but do not carry the liquidity premium built into Treasury yields. 
Discounting the distribution of expected future liabilities back to a current “value” is 
much more difficult. The PIMS User Manual explicitly states that the model should only be used 
to forecast possible outcomes, so it cannot be used to calculate a present value of these future 
liabilities. In practice, however, users of the model seem unable to refrain from doing so. The 
headline summary statistic that people use to talk about the funding status of the PBGC comes 
directly from discounting the expected future liability at risk-free rates, which is completely 
inappropriate. Moreover, this certainly understates the true magnitude of the PBGC 
underfunding.  
Despite the fact that the evolution of the termination liabilities in the PIMS model is 




assume these liabilities is driven in large part by market and macroeconomic risks. If the PBGC’s 
underfunding is particularly large in 10 years, it will almost certainly be because the U.S. 
economy underperformed expectations. This is precisely the time at which any given level of 
underfunding will be particularly painful, and discounting the models’ forecasted distribution of 
future underfunding fails to account for this reality. 
Moving towards modeling the distribution of future liabilities in a manner that accounts 
for the price of risk (i.e., using a “risk-neutral” framework) would allow for calculating the 
present value of the future liabilities more accurately. This can be an important step for the PIMS 
system, as it would provide policymakers with information more relevant for decisionmaking. A 
proper valuation would account for the possibility of painful “tail events,” and do so in a way 
that appropriately accounts for the pain associated with these relatively low probability events. 
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